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This article analyses the appropriate duty of care under English tort law for social auditors 
towards third parties at risk of suffering damages from their negligence. After explaining the 
work of social auditors, the article considers whether the duty of care established for financial 
auditors is an appropriate one for social auditors. It concludes that a robust duty of care does 
exist for social auditors to guard against negligent audits that could harm workers at audited 
facilities. Due to differences between the financial and social audit, it further argues the duty of 
care for social auditors should be both broader than that required of the financial audit industry 
and non-delegable.  
 
In diesem Artikel wird untersucht, welche Sorgfaltspflichten nach dem englischen Deliktsrecht 
für Sozialauditoren angemessen wären, die durch fahrlässige Audits Dritte in die Gefahr von 
schweren Schäden bringen. Nach Erläuterung der konkreten Aufgaben von Sozialauditoren prüft 
der Artikel, ob die für Finanzauditoren geltenden Sorgfaltspflichten auch für Sozialauditoren 
geeignet sind. Der Artikel kommt zu dem Schluss, dass strenge Sorgfaltspflichten für 
Sozialauditoren erforderlich sind, aber auch bereits existieren, um die Mitarbeiter in den 
geprüften Einrichtungen gegen fahrlässige Audits zu schützen. Aufgrund der Unterschiede 
zwischen Finanz- und Sozialaudit wird die Auffassung vertreten, dass die Sorgfaltspflichten von 
Sozialauditoren in ihren Anforderungen über die der Finanzauditbranche hinausgehen müssen. 
Zudem sollten Sozialauditoren ihre Sorgfaltspflichten nicht auf andere Akteure übertragen 
können. 
 
Cet article analyse le devoir de diligence applicable aux auditeurs sociaux en vertu du droit 
anglais de la responsabilité délictuelle, à l’égard des tiers susceptibles de subir des dommages 
résultant d’une négligence. Après avoir décrit le travail des auditeurs sociaux, l'article examine 
si le devoir de diligence établi pour les auditeurs financiers est approprié pour les auditeurs 
sociaux. Il conclut qu'il existe un devoir de diligence solide pour les auditeurs sociaux en vertu 
duquel ces derniers doivent se prémunir contre les audits négligents potentiellement nuisibles 
aux travailleurs des établissements audités. Au regard des différences entre l'audit financier et 
social, cet article soutient en outre que le devoir de vigilance des auditeurs sociaux devrait être 
plus large que celui applicable au secteur de l'audit financier, ainsi que non-délégable. 
 
  
                                                 
* Lecturer, University of Essex; Core Member, Essex Business and Human Rights Project. With appreciation to Lisa 
Kadel and Mallika Tamvada for research assistance, Anil Yilmaz-Vastardis for support, and Geoff Gilbert, Darren 
Calley, Emily Jones, Johanna Hoekstra, Timothy Lytton, Niall O’Connor, Jaime Lindsey, Paul Verbruggen, and the 
anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts and arguments.  
** Senior Legal Advisor, European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights. 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1. This article analyses the appropriate duty of care under English tort law for injuries caused to 
others by a negligent social audit. In the textile industry, a social audit is a workplace assessment 
conducted over a few days by a single auditor or an auditing team. It represents a form of private 
regulation of corporate compliance with socially expected behaviour.1 The need to assess social 
auditor liability has come to mainstream consciousness with a series of significant disasters in 
recent years. When French-headquartered Bureau Veritas inspected the Rana Plaza factory in 
Bangladesh, it failed to note that the building was not permitted for use as a factory, nor, as we 
learned later, was it fit to do so.2 In 2013, the building collapsed, killing 1,134 workers.3 A fire at 
an Ali Enterprises factory in Karachi, Pakistan, cost 260 workers their lives and injured another 
30; weeks earlier a subcontractor of Italian firm RINA s.p.a. conducted an audit that led to the 
approval of an SA8000 certification. 4  The SA8000 is designed to indicate good working 
conditions.5 On the day of the fire, the factory had an illegal wooden mezzanine, and did not 
have sufficient emergency exits.6 These are issues that should have been, but were not, noted in 
the social audit. Bureau Veritas has been sued in Canadian courts for negligence, while RINA is 
the subject of a criminal investigation in Italy and a complaint before the Italian OECD National 
Contact Point.7 
 
2. Social audits began in earnest in the 1990s following campaigns by consumers and unions 
concerned that the outsourcing of textile manufacturing came with a clear, negative impact on 
worker conditions in developing states.8 The common perception of a regulatory gap in the 
textile industry led lead brands to commit to company, industry, multi-brand and multi-
stakeholder codes of conduct based on international human rights and labour rights law.9 To 
document conformity with those standards, the brands employed independent social audits and 
auditors to evaluate the conditions at the factories supplying their goods.10  
 
3. Given the history and purpose of the social audit industry, the worker’s protection is supposed 
to be at the heart of the process. Unfortunately, as the industry has developed, there have been 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., G. LEBARON & J. LISTER, ‘Benchmarking Global Supply Chains: The Power of the ‘Ethical Audit’ 
Regime, in 41. Review of International Studies 2015, p. (905) at (906-907); G. LEBARON, J. LISTER & P. 
DAUVERGNE, ‘Governing Global Supply Chain Sustainability through the Ethical Audit Regime’ in 14. 
Globalizations 2017, p. 958 at 965.  
2
 Ontario Supreme Court of Justice 5 July 2017, Das v. George Weston Limited, 
https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2017/2017onsc4129/2017onsc4129.html.  
3
 Ibid. 
4
 C. TERWINDT & M. SAAGE-MAAß, ‘Liability of social auditors in the textile industry’, in ECCHR and FES Policy 
Paper 2016, at 11. 
5
 Responsibility Outsourced (AFL-CIO 2013) at 33.   
6
 Specific Instance Communication to the Italian OECD National Contact Point Ali Enterprise Factory Fire Affectees 
Association et al. v RINA Services S.p.A., at 10-11, https://www.oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_514 (‘OECD National 
Contact Point’).  
7
 See, ibid, at 10-11; Ontario Supreme Court of Justice 5 July 2017, fn 2. 
8
 R. VAN TULDER, J. VAN WIJK & A. KOLK, ‘From chain liability to chain responsibility,’ in 85. Journal of 
Business Ethics 2009, p. 399. 
9
 Ibid. 
10  CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN, Looking for a Quick Fix: How Weak Social Auditing Is Keeping Workers in 
Sweatshops 2005, at 12.  
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documented problems of abuse, conflicts of interest, intentional misstatements and claims of 
negligence.11 As early as 2005, the Clean Clothes Campaign identified significant problems with 
social audits, including superficial audits and the likelihood of deception.12 Despite this, the 
industry now valued at anywhere between US$15 and 80 billion annually13 remains largely 
unregulated. Even the Association of Professional Social Compliance Auditors (APSCA) 
acknowledges that ‘currently, you could ask anyone to conduct a social audit and there is nothing 
stopping them, and no way to verify their qualifications’.14  
 
4. The lack of regulation and industry standards creates an incentive for lax standards. For-profit 
firms, notably financial auditing firms that have expanded into social auditing, conduct the vast 
majority of social audits.15 Their clients are primarily factory owners, for whom a successful 
audit can ensure new and continuing partnerships with powerful purchasers.16 When an owner 
wishes to receive certification without undertaking the relevant investment or modifications, 
there is an economic incentive to seek out lenient auditors. 17  In turn, auditing companies 
interested in keeping their clients in an increasingly competitive market, and unencumbered by 
regulation or industry standards, have been found to relax standards and to ignore compliance 
issues.18  
 
5. Despite the concerns over social auditing, and scholarship that questions the utility and 
appropriateness of the industry’s standards, 19  scholars have yet to examine the appropriate 
application of English tort law on this issue. This article initiates consideration of the liability of 
social auditors for negligent audits under English tort law by focusing on the duty of care, setting 
aside the other elements of tort law for future scholarship. This piece is intended to stimulate 
discussions amongst scholars of business and human rights and tort law on the current standards 
for social auditors and on what reforms are necessary to ensure strong social auditing standards. 
The piece is perhaps overdue. English law is often relied upon by courts in common law states, 
including Bangladesh and Pakistani law, to help clarify standards of liability in novel cases. As 
Bangladesh and Pakistani laws would usually govern civil claims against Bureau Veritas and 
RINA, respectively, identifying the appropriate duty of care under English law can have a 
significant impact on these pending situations. It can also be of benefit to the social auditing 
industry. The social auditing industry has developed as a form of private regulation but without 
any public regulation to control it and without significant reflection on what is being asked of or 
undertaken by social auditors. As such, there is a risk that auditors are performing their 
contractual duties without fully appreciating to whom they have assumed a duty of care under 
                                                 
11
 LeBaron & Lister, fn 1, at 913-914; Clean Clothes Campaign fn 10, at 12. 
12
 Clean Clothes Campaign fn 10, at 12. 
13 G. BROWN, ‘Effective protection of workers’ health and safety in global supply chains’, in 7 International 
Journal of Labour Research 2015, p. 35. 
14
 VERISK MAPLECROFT, Human Rights Outlook 2017, p. 7.  
15
 F. FRANSEN & G. LEBARON, ‘Big Audit Firms as Regulatory Intermediaries in Transnational Labor Governance,’ 
in Regulation & Governance (first published online, 4 October 2018), available at 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/rego.12224.  
16
 LEBARON & LISTER, fn 1, at 913-914. 
17
 G. JAHN, M. SCHRAMM and A. SPILLER, ‘The Reliability of Certification: Quality Labels as a Consumer Policy 
Tool,’ in 28. Journal of Consumer Policy 2005 p. 53 at 61-62. 
18
 Ibid, at 61-62. 
19
 Most recently, see, FRANSEN & LEBARON, fn 15. 
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tort law. Greater clarity over their obligations can lead to better auditing standards and clearer 
industry regulations. 
 
6. Establishing a duty of care is the first step to establishing civil liability for negligence under 
English law and identifying the appropriate duty of care can have a profound impact on the 
viability of claims by victims. Identifying a duty of care in novel factual situations can be 
complex. This article develops the analysis in four parts. Part 2 explains how social audits work 
and the problems stemming from a lack of professional regulation over social auditors. Part 3 
introduces the English approach to ‘duty of care’ and examines the duty of care for financial 
auditors as an analogous industry before Part 4 considers whether the duties of care owed by 
financial auditors should be extended when applied to the social auditing industry. Part 5 
concludes that social auditors owe a duty of care to workers on an audited premises, and possibly 
more broadly. It raises outstanding questions for scholars and the industry before arguing that the 
UK and other states would benefit from adopting specific regulatory standards for social 
auditors. 
 
2. The Problem with Social Auditors  
7. To identify the appropriate duty of care, it is necessary to understand the social auditing 
industry and the problems within the industry, which is the focus of this section. 
 
2.1. The Social Auditing Industry 
8. During a social audit, auditors should review documentation supplied by management to 
check whether, for example, wages and hours are in line with the applicable labour standards, 
and physically inspect the factory floor to ensure the presence of requisite health and safety 
measures like functioning emergency exits, ventilation, cleanliness, and safety equipment.20 
Additionally, auditors should conduct interviews with management and workers to ensure the 
accuracy of information and practices, examining, for example, whether payslips are accurate or 
union activity is suppressed.21  Diagnostic social audits are generally followed by corrective 
action plans. When social audits identify problematic activities, the owner should develop and 
implement the corrective action plan.22 Where they fail to do so, the expectation, and business 
model for the industry, is that the purchasing companies will exert pressure to secure 
implementation of the plan.23 The implementation of the action plans should be inspected in 
follow-up visits. 
 
9. The standards employed in social audits vary widely. The SA8000 certification granted to Ali 
Enterprises is owned by SAI, a global NGO established to promote socially responsible 
workplaces, and is promoted as the ‘gold standard of social auditing’.24 The SA8000 has an 
‘independent accreditation body’ that decides whether third-party firms are qualified to monitor 
and award supplier factories with an SA8000 certification.25 It is not, however, the only standard 
                                                 
20
 Clean Clothes Campaign fn 10, at 23.    
21
 Ibid.   
22
 Ibid.   
23
 Ibid.   
24
 AFL-CIO, fn 5, at 33.   
25  SAI, “SA8000® Standard and Documents”, 2016, on SAI Website. Available at: http://www.sa-
intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&PageID=937. 
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available. Bureau Veritas offered a range of social audit services, starting with a ‘basic audit’, 
which evaluated compliance with ‘the client’s code of conduct,’ meaning the code set by the 
purchaser, along with a code of conduct Bureau Veritas developed, local laws and regulations, 
and ‘industry standards established by organizations such as the International Labour 
Organization.’26 The client behind its inspection of the Rana Plaza factory purchased the basic 
audit; an audit that would have examined the building’s structural integrity would have cost an 
additional $5200 USD.27 
 
10. Large auditing firms regularly outsource the physical inspection of supplier facilities to local 
firms.28  RINA did this with the audit of the Ali Enterprises factory.29  Studies indicate that 
cheating and corruption in the social auditing industry has become commonplace, as ‘evasion’ of 
negative findings ‘has become more efficient and sophisticated.’30 As the deaths at the Rana 
Plaza and Ali Enterprises factories have shown, unduly flattering audit reports are a real concern. 
It may be that in some circumstances even the best reports fail to persuade producers to change 
their practices, but when social auditors are negligent, the opportunity to identify and implement 
necessary changes is thwarted. In these cases, the negligent audit is more than simply an 
omission; it is a positive act that alters the course of conduct moving forward.  
 
2.2. The Need for Civil Liability  
11. Currently, there are few consequences for negligent social audits. Financial audits are usually 
mandated for companies, and both government regulation and industry standards identify clear 
standards of conduct.31 Without government regulation or an industry standard, the social audit 
industry relies on external pressure and oversight. Since the lead brands are generally not held 
liable for subsequent harm experienced by workers of supply chain partners,32 there is little 
incentive to ensure that the audits are accurate, particularly if doing so would undermine 
commercial interests like time or volume commitments. 33  Workers and unions do have an 
incentive to hold social auditors accountable but are often unable to do so. Audit reports are 
rarely made public.34 Regarded as confidential and the property of the auditor’s client, lead 
brands and retailers do not currently require social audits to be disclosed.35  This makes it 
difficult for workers or unions to exert pressure or seek accountability for social auditing firms 
even where the workers or unions are aware of threats or lax social conditions. 
 
                                                 
26
 Ontario Supreme Court of Justice 5 July 2017, fn 2 at para 53. 
27
 Ibid, at para 54. 
28
 Ibid, at para 54. 
29
 See, OECD National Contact Point, fn 6.  
30
 LEBARON, LISTER & P. DAUVERGNE, fn 1, at 970. 
31
 See, e.g., UK Companies Act 2006, section 498; §323 HGB in Germany. In the EU, laws traditionally require that 
financial accounts give a “true and fair view” of a company’s financial status (European Union, 1995, §3.11; e.g. UK 
Companies Act 2006, section 495 (3)(a)) (European Union, 2016). See also, EU Regulation No 537/2014, 16 April 
2014, preliminary consideration 7 & 10, Article 4. 
32
 But see, C. TERWINDT, S. LEADER, S., A. YILMAZ-VASTARDIS & J. WRIGHT, ‘Supply Chain Liability: Pushing the 
Boundaries of the Common Law?’ 8. Journal of European Tort Law 2018, p. 261 at 261-296.  
33
 For a more robust discussion of how the auditing industry protects the commercial interests of brands while 
concealing ethical concerns, see LEBARON, LISTER & P. DAUVERGNE, fn 1. 
34
 Terwindt & Saage Maaß, fn 4.  
35
 Ibid. 
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12. Despite the problems, demand for social auditing is growing.36 This is partly due to an 
increase in human rights due diligence and disclosure laws, a result of international efforts to 
better protect human rights throughout supply chains. The UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights state an international expectation that businesses will identify and mitigate 
the human rights impacts of their operations, including those that arise through business 
relationships such as supply chains.37 The expectation for greater supply chain engagement has 
encouraged companies, and even some non-governmental organizations, to rely more heavily on 
social audits.38 As long as audits are carried out, the question is how to effectively control their 
quality. Scholars have recognized that tort claims can influence behaviour and deter 
recklessness, particularly within definable industries.39 Tort claims are already having an impact 
within the social auditing industry. When German retailer KiK was sued for its alleged role in 
the Ali Enterprises fire, the company agreed to pay $5.15 million USD to those injured while it 
contests the suit in Germany.40 It also changed its standards for social auditors. The company can 
now hold a social auditor ‘legally liable for their findings on the ground for a period of three 
months following the audits.’41 
 
13. It is necessary to question, however, whether lead firms should be able to set the conditions 
of social audits, and be the only ones capable of recovering damages caused by a negligent social 
audit. In considering Bureau Vertias’ liability, the Canadian trial judge pointed to the contract 
between the auditing company and its client as evidence that the former had only a ‘limited 
remit’ and therefore did not owe a duty of care towards the plaintiffs to ensure the building’s 
structure. 42  Upon appeal, the reasoning was upheld as the appellate court concluded that 
Bangladeshi law would not impose a duty of care on the social auditor to exceed the remit of the 
contract.43 The decisions of the Canadian courts raise two questions: do auditing firms owe a 
duty of care to the client’s workers, and if so, what should the standard of care be? Both 
questions are complex. The issue of standard of care sits outside the remit of this piece, but it is 
worth noting that those who hold themselves out as experts are judged against the standard of a 
reasonable person with their claimed expertise.44 The next section begins to analyse the existence 
of a duty of care to workers on the premises of an audited property. 
 
3. English Duty of Care Standards 
                                                 
36 VERISK MAPLECROFT, fn 14, at 7. 
37
 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 (2011) at Principle 13(b) and 
commentary. 
38
 LEBARON, LISTER & P. DAUVERGNE, fn 1, at 964. 
39
 See, e.g., J. MORGAN, ‘Abolishing personal injuries law? A response to Lord Sumption,’ in Professional 
Negligence (2018), p.122 at 128-129; See in detail VERBRUGGEN (Introduction), LYTTON, GLINSKI & ROTT, and DE 
BRUYNE in this Issue. 
40
 LeBaron, Lister & P. Dauvergne, fn 1. 
41 L. BARRIE, ‘How KiK is raising the bar on working conditions: Interview,’ Just-Style: Apparel Sourcing 
Strategy (11 April 2017), http://www.just-style.com/interview/how-kik-is-raising-the-bar-on-working-
conditions-interview_id130409.aspx. 
42
 Ontario Supreme Court of Justice 5 July 2017, fn 2 at para 59. 
43 Ontario Court of Appeal, 20 December 2018, Das v. George Weston Limited, 2018 ONCA 1053, paras 195-200 
https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2018/2018onca1053/2018onca1053.html. 
44
 See, English High Court, 26 February 1957, Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee, [1957] 1 WLR 
582. For limits to the application of this test, see, UKSC, 11 March 2015, Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board, 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/decided-cases/docs/UKSC_2013_0136_Judgment.pdf. 
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14. The English law on negligence – the notion that one owes a duty to not harm others through 
carelessness even absent a contractual obligation – was famously pronounced by Lord Atkins in 
Donoghue v. Stevenson: ‘The [moral] rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes, in law, 
you must not injure your neighbour.’45 The first step to establishing negligence is identifying a 
duty of care owed to the person harmed. English courts have spent much of the last 50 years 
attempting to clarify when a duty of care arises. This section outlines the current tests for 
establishing a duty of care before examining the case law on ‘negligent misstatements’ by 
auditors and others. 
 
15. In classifying claims against a social auditor, it is necessary to briefly recognize that we are 
discussing cases of negligent action. Claims against social auditors should not be understood as 
attempting to ascribe liability for a ‘pure’ omission. Omissions in English case law arise when 
one could foresee that their failure to act would cause another harm, but they choose not to act 
nonetheless.46 A common example of a pure omission is where one does not warn a stranger, or 
even a neighbour, of an impending danger.47 In such cases, English courts are reticent to find a 
duty to undertake action unless there is a special relationship.48 But where one undertakes an act, 
there is a responsibility to undertake that act with due care. In considering the responsibility of 
social auditors, it is not the failure to intervene that gives rise to the claim, but rather it is the 
negligent conduct of an inspection and certification that is the focus of the claim.  
 
3.1. Duty of Care Principles 
16. When assessing duties of care – or the application of existing duties to novel situations – 
English courts employ three competing tests developed for general duties of care, although 
exceptions to these tests are also recognized in both common law and statutes.49 The leading 
approach for novel claims is the three-prong test developed in Caparo Industries v. Dickman, 
where the House of Lords concluded that a duty of care exists only when the plaintiff has shown 
that (1) the damage was foreseeable, (2) there was proximity between the parties, so that (3) it is 
‘fair, just and reasonable’ for the court to impose liability on the defendant.50 The criteria are, in 
fact, ‘facets of the same thing.’51 Amongst the criticisms of the Caparo test is that plaintiffs must 
now show that the imposition of liability is not only allowed but is appropriate in light of the full 
context and competing policy considerations.52 This is a contentious approach as the introduction 
of policy suggests judges are making determinations better suited for the legislature.53  
                                                 
45
 UKHL, 26 May 1932, Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562 at 580, 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1932/100.html.  
46  See, UKHL, 6 May 1970, Dorset Yacht v Home Office [1970] AC 1004 at 1060, 
https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1970/2.html.  
47 See, Jenny Steele, Tort Law: Text, Cases and Materials (3rd ed.) (2014) at 164. 
48 Ibid; UKHL, 18 February 2009, Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] HL 11 at para 15 (Lord Hope). 
49
 See, e.g., UKSC, 8 February 2018, Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, paras 
21-30, https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2016-0082-judgment.pdf; UKHL, 28 December 1991, 
Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, [1992] AC 310 (addressing psychiatric harm). 
50
 UKHL, 8 February 1990, Caparo Industries v. Dickman [1990] 2 A.C. 605 at 617-618, 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1990/2.html.  
51
 Ibid, at 633. 
52
 See, C. F. STYCHIN, ‘The Vulnerable Subject of Negligence Law,’ in 3. International Journal of Law in Context 
2012, p. 337. 
53
 Ibid. 
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17. Caparo has a limited purpose: addressing novel claims 54 English courts also employ two 
other tests. The first of these is the ‘incremental approach,’ which allows for the recognition of a 
duty of care only where a close analogy can be drawn to existing duties.55 Courts also use the 
‘assumption of responsibility’ test, which recognizes a relationship arises so as to create a duty 
of care when one party has ‘voluntarily accepted or undertaken’ a responsibility towards the 
other, either through an ongoing relationship (such as between a solicitor and her client) or for 
the purpose of a single transaction.56 The corollary to the assumption of responsibility is that a 
party can sometimes disavow the duty of care for economic losses by issuing a reasonable 
disclaimer.57 
 
18. While some have argued that the differences in the three tests are significant,58  others, 
notably Brian Neill, LJ, have claimed that it is likely that when ‘facts are properly analysed and 
the policy considerations are correctly evaluated the several approaches will yield the same 
result.’ 59  Neill is responsible for identifying additional factors that should be considered 
specifically when deciding whether a duty of care exists between a professional advisor and a 
third party.60 The factors include the purpose of the communication, the relevant relationships at 
play, knowledge that an advisee will rely on the advice, the size of the class of potential 
claimants, whether the adviser has had an opportunity to issue a disclaimer and has done so, and 
whether the advisee actually relied on the advice.61  
 
19. Finally, and significantly for questions of social auditor liability, English courts have long 
distinguished between duties on the basis of the damages sustained. Where there is a risk of 
physical harm or property damage, there is likely to be a broader duty of care to those could 
foreseeably be harmed even if they do not have a previous relationship.62 For ‘purely economic’ 
losses, an advisor is likely to have a limited duty of care only to those they knew or could 
reasonably foresee would rely on the advice for a particular purpose.63 As is seen below, this 
                                                 
54
 UKSC, 8 February 2018, fn 49 at paras 21-30. 
55
 UKSC 28 February 2018, NRAM Ltd (formerly NRAM plc) v Steel and another, at para 22 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2016-0111.html.   
56
 UKCA 4 March 1998, Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd (In Liquidation) v Price 
Waterhouse (No. 2), [1998] P.N.L.R. 564 at 585. 
57
 See, UKQB, 18 February 2015, Barclays Bank Plc v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2015] 1 C.L.C. 180 at 89. For some 
limitations to this rule, see, e.g., Unfair Contract Terms Act [1977] Ch 50. For more on this, see, A. BOWEN QC, 
‘Case Comment: “Bannerman” disclaimers and auditors’ liability’ – Barclays Bank Plc v Grant Thornton UK LLP 
[2015] 2 B.C.L.C. 537,’ in Business Law Bulletin 2016, p. 1.   
58
 See, e.g., J. HARTSHORNE, ‘Confusion, Contradiction and Chaos within the House of Lords post Caparo v 
Dickman,’ in 16. Tort Law Review 2008, p. 8 at 8-9; K. STANTON, ‘Decision-making in the Tort of Negligence in the 
House of Lords,’ in 15. Tort Law Review 2007, p. 93; D. HOWARTH, ‘Poisoned Wells: “Proximity” and “Assumption 
of Responsibility” in Negligence,’ in 62. Cambridge Law Journal 2005, p. 23. 
59
 UKCA 4 March 1998, fn 56 at 586. 
60
 UKCA 31 July 1990, James McNaughton Paper Group Ltd. v Hicks Anderson & Co. [1991] 2 QB 113, 125-127 
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1990/11.html; UKCA 4 March 1998, fn 56 at 587-588.  
61
 UKCA 31 July 1990, fn 60 at 125-127; UKCA 4 March 1998, fn 56 at 587-588. 
62
 UKHL, 8 February 1990, fn 50 at 618; UKCA, 22 May 1998, Perrett v Collins and Ors [199] PNLR 77, 84 
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1998/884.html. 
63
 UKHL, 8 February 1990, fn 50 at 618; UKCA 22 May 1998, fn 62 at 84. 
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distinction is significant when comparing the recognized duties of care owed by financial and 
that which should be owed by social auditors. 
 
20. In employing these tests and factors to a novel claim, it is necessary to next identify existing 
analogous duties, and then determine whether the similarities and differences in those claims 
justify the recognition of the duty of care in the novel situation. English courts have already 
addressed financial auditor liability. The same actors dominate the financial and social auditing 
industries, suggesting this may be an appropriate start.64 
 
3.2. Responsibility for Negligent Misstatements that Harm Others 
21. Negligent financial audits, which inaccurately depict a factual situation, are treated under a 
broader category of ‘negligent misstatements,’65 which is the focus of this section. The primary 
question in these cases is to which third parties did an auditor assume a duty of care when 
certifying as true something that turned out to be false. Similarly, a claim for social auditor 
liability would rest on an assertion that the social auditor knew the workers are dependent on the 
audit to protect them and yet the auditor still failed to appropriately identify risks that they knew 
or should have known existed. 
 
3.2.1. Negligent Misstatements and Financial Auditors  
22. English law recognizes that professionals who are employed for their opinion owe a duty of 
care to those who hire them for that opinion.66 In addition to the direct purchaser or client, 
professionals asked for their advice or assessment can owe a duty of care to certain third parties, 
although it is rare. In Caparo, which relates to a financial auditor’s duty of care to a prospective 
investor, Lord Bridge of Harwich concluded that an auditor is responsible to a third party only 
insofar as the auditor was aware that the third party would rely on the auditor’s statement.67 In 
light of the economic nature of the damages, Lord Bridge concluded that there needs to be a 
‘control mechanism’ limiting liability only to those in a ‘proximate’ relationship with the auditor 
so that the auditor would anticipate the use of the statement. This includes those the auditor 
knew, or could have reasonably anticipated, would rely on the report. As such, a general audit 
released to the public at large without an intention of inviting investment will not trigger a duty 
to each member of the public. 68  Potential investors – even those who are also existing 
shareholders – are simply members of the general public, and the auditor cannot anticipate how 
each member of the public will use or rely on the report.69 Allowing for a duty of care to each 
potential investor would unfairly subject the auditor to ‘an indeterminate amount’ of liability ‘for 
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class’ while allowing anyone who wishes ‘a quite 
unwarranted entitlement to appropriate for their own purposes the benefit of the expert 
knowledge or professional expertise attributed to the maker of the statement.70  
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23. In determining whom the auditor knew or should have anticipated would use the reports, 
English courts have mixed the general duty of care tests outlined above. Courts have found 
auditors owed a duty of care under the ‘assumption of responsibility’ test directly to shareholders 
where the auditors were employed for the purpose of valuing the company’s shares before a 
compulsory acquisition,71 and to a holding company when the auditors were aware that the 
accounts of a subsidiary would be given to the holding company’s directors who would 
reasonably desire a true and accurate statement. 72  A duty of care was also owed to other 
companies in a closely-knit group when the auditors were employed by only one of those 
companies because the relationships at issue provided for ‘a significant degree’ of closeness 
between the auditor and the other companies.73 On the other hand, auditors have been found to 
not owe a duty of care to a third party purchaser when that party could discern that the accounts 
were in draft form and could avail themselves of alternative assistance,74 or when an audit was 
neither communicated directly to a bank nor prepared with the intention or knowledge that it 
would be shared with the bank, which was not a creditor on the day of the audit.75  
 
24. To date, financial auditor liability cases have focused on the expectations of the financial 
auditor. Some scholars have argued that the limits outlined here create an ‘expectation gap’ 
between the public and the auditor as to the responsibility of an auditor to detect fraud or 
misuse.76 Implicit in the decisions, however, appears to be concern about ensuring an efficient 
system of accounting that might be undermined if auditors are dissuaded from performing their 
duties because they will be liable for an ‘indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an 
indeterminate class.’ 77  Lord Sumption has stated publicly that judges remain ‘sensitive to 
considerations of economic efficiency,’ even if they ‘rarely acknowledge the fact.’ 78  The 
insistence of a control mechanism by which the courts can limit claims of an economic loss 
allows for financial auditors to engage in a precarious but necessary industry without being put at 
risk for boundless claims for their mistakes.  
 
3.2.2. Workers as Known Third Parties 
25. Financial auditors owe a duty of care to individuals or classes of persons that they know, or 
can reasonably anticipate, will rely on their reports. When considering whether to recognize that 
social auditors owe a duty of care similar to that owed by financial auditors, the first question is 
the extent to which workers and others routinely on the premises of an audited property might be 
considered known third parties akin to that owed by a financial auditor to known creditors or 
parent companies. The social auditor is aware of the relationship between himself, the audited 
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company, and those routinely present on an audited property. After all, the social auditor should 
be present on the premises and interviewing workers as part of the audit.79 Social auditors are 
also aware that the workers are expected to be protected by the audit, and that the workers are 
reliant on the audit to raise concerns about their safety and conditions. Finally, the (approximate) 
number of such individuals is also known to the auditor and can be reasonably identified in 
advance. Workers on audited premises can therefore be distinguished from the general 
population. As such, to the extent that workers and others routinely on the premises know and 
rely on the social audit, they appear to be owed a duty of care; a natural, incremental step from 
the recognized duty of a financial auditor to a known third party. 
 
26. The next question, however, is the extent to which the duty of care for social auditors should 
be limited only to those workers or others who knowingly rely on the report or if there are other 
relevant factors that might extend the duty of care further. The requirement of knowledge of and 
reliance on the social audit may be inappropriate for workers or others in a position of 
vulnerability who should be protected by a social audit even if they are unaware of its specific 
existence or content. The strict application of the standards developed under financial auditor 
liability is also problematic as it would extend a limited liability designed to protect a necessary, 
established, and regulated industry whose negligence is likely to cause only economic loss (the 
financial industry) to the newer social auditing industry that remains unregulated and whose 
negligence is likely to cause harms resulting in personal injuries and property damage. The 
differences between the two industries are significant enough that the approach for financial 
auditors appears inappropriate for social auditors. As financial auditor liability is only a subset of 
negligent misstatement case law, it is worth extending out briefly to consider other factors that 
can influence the duty of care.  
 
3.2.3. Implicit knowledge and reliance  
27. The assumption of responsibility test does not require an explicit agreement.80 In a negligent 
misstatement case involving surveyor liability, Smith v Eric S Bush, Lord Griffiths noted that it 
‘is extremely unlikely’ for a professional to expressly assume responsibility to a third party, but 
the surrounding context can give rise to an implicit yet clear assumption of responsibility.81 
Smith addressed two cases in which surveyors were contracted by a banking society to inspect 
and value modestly priced homes.82 In both cases, the surveyor’s valuation created the basis for a 
mortgage. Lord Griffiths explained that it was a common practice within the industry for a 
building society to share a surveyor’s report with the purchaser.83 In one case, the surveyor knew 
that the report would be given to the purchaser. With that explicit knowledge, even the surveyor 
conceded that a duty of care was owed but argued instead that their disclaimer of liability 
absolved them of this duty.84  
 
28. The second case presented a ‘very much more difficult’ set of facts because the surveyor did 
not know the report would be shared and the purchaser did not in fact receive a copy of the 
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report. 85  Yet, both Lords Templeman and Griffiths found that the assessor was aware that 
‘valuation will probably be relied upon by the purchaser.’86 In approximately 90 per cent of the 
cases, purchasers relied on the valuations that underpin the offer.87 For Lord Templeman, it was 
relevant that the valuation fee is ‘paid by the purchaser’ who is likely to rely on the report.88 For 
Lord Griffiths, ‘[t]he necessary proximity arises from the surveyor’s knowledge that the 
overwhelming probability is that the purchaser will rely upon the valuation.’89 As the advice was 
given in a professional context, and the liability would be limited only to the immediate 
purchaser of the home, as opposed to subsequent purchasers, it seemed just and reasonable to 
impose the duty of care in this situation. 90  Lord Jauncey expressed some hesitations with 
extending the duty of care to those who have not relied on the report, but ultimately agreed with 
his colleagues.91 
 
This case is significant as the purchasers were not required to have explicit knowledge or 
reliance on the assessment, nor was the surveyor required to have explicit knowledge of the 
purchasers’ reliance on the report. Both were found to exist as a consequence of the nature and 
purpose of the industry and the assessment. As Lord Griffiths recognized, had the purchaser 
directly employed the inspector for this purpose, there would have been no doubt over the 
existence of the duty of care.92 This suggests that in certain circumstances, the industry and the 
purpose of an activity can create an implicit reliance that creates a duty of care. 
 
3.2.4. Purpose, Power, Control, and Vulnerability as Factors 
29. English courts have also explicitly and implicitly identified power, control, and vulnerability 
as factors in their reasoning. This is perhaps obvious given that the Caparo test calls for 
consideration of what is just, fair, and reasonable, inherently raising issues of power, control and 
vulnerability as pertinent factors. As noted above, the surveyors in Smith argued that a disclaimer 
of liability precluded a duty of care.93 To determine whether the disclaimer was valid, the House 
of Lords needed to decide if, inter alia, it was ‘reasonable’ to exclude liability in light of the 
disclaimer and its context.94 While the case centered on the Unfair Contract Terms Act,95 the 
reasonableness test employed mirrors the reasonableness standard in the Caparo test.96 With the 
caveat that an exhaustive list may be impossible, Lord Griffiths noted some pertinent factors: 
‘[w]ere the parties of equal bargaining power,’ could the one party obtain ‘advice from an 
alternative source taking into account considerations of costs and time,’ whether the take was 
particularly difficult and therefore carried a ‘high risk of failure’ so as to justify the limitation of 
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liability, and the ‘practical consequences of the decision’, including who will bear the loss 
involved.97 
 
30. Two of Lord Griffiths’s four factors explicitly relate to power and control: whether one party 
exercises greater power and whether the other is reliant on them in the exercise of that power. A 
third factor, the practical consequences of the imposition of liability, relates implicitly to 
vulnerability. Lord Griffiths explained that professionals are expected to carry insurance.98 As 
such, the professional is unlikely to be unduly burdened by the cost of compensation whereas it 
is ‘quite possible that it will be a financial catastrophe for the purchaser who may be left with a 
valueless house and no money to buy another.’99 If the case had involved more valuable homes 
with purchasers capable of securing independent advice, Lord Griffiths conceded there might 
have been a different outcome.100  
 
31. Lord Giffiths listed one factor that does not relate to power and vulnerability, which is the 
difficulty of the task. Lord Griffiths concluded here that ‘a valuation … should present no 
difficulty is undertaken with reasonable skill and care’ as it requires only careful observation and 
examination; it is not reasonable to limit liability for ‘the fairly elementary degree of skill and 
care involved in observing, follow-up and reporting on such defects.’101 It stands to reason that it 
is reasonable to impose a duty of care for social audits, which also require no greater skill and 
care than observing, following-up, and reporting on defects through careful visual examination. 
In carrying out these ‘fairly elementary’ activities, Lord Templeman explained that the house 
inspectors owe two sets of duties: one arising from how the work is carried out in order to make 
the report, and the second in the preparation of the report.102 Had the surveyors in these cases 
discharged their first duties appropriately, the second would have followed.  
 
32. Power and purpose were factors in Sutradhar v Natural Environment Research Council, but 
in a different manner than in Smith.103  The case involved a pilot study of water quality in 
northern Bangladesh by the British Geological Survey (BGS), a department of the UK Overseas 
Development Agency (ODA).104 The study was funded with unspent money BGS had from 
ODA and ran alongside but was unconnected to a separate initiative from the United Nations to 
install new drinking supplies in rural areas. 105  The study tested 31 elements that can be 
hazardous to human health in 150 sites in northern Bangladesh.106 The tested elements did not 
include arsenic, which turned out to be present in harmful doses.107 A Bangladeshi man who 
drank from the tested sites and suffered serious health issues as a result argued that BGS failed in 
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its duty of care by not testing for arsenic or not making it clearer that arsenic was not tested.108 
The 31 elements that were tested were listed in the report, but the claimant argued that the report 
‘lulled’ the authorities into a false sense of security over the water quality.109 
 
33. At the House of Lords, Lord Hoffmann questioned whether a positive obligation to test for 
arsenic existed. Here, issues of power, control and authority were explicit and implicit. The 
purpose of the study, according to Lord Hoffmann, was to test ‘the efficiency of tubewell 
designs.’110 The test was not designed for examining the appropriateness of the water for human 
consumption. More importantly, ‘BGS had no connection with the drinking water project and no 
one asked them to test the water for potability.’111 The pilot study, according to Hoffmann, was 
simply ‘an accident of the availability of the funds.’112 In distinguishing Sutradhar from Perrett 
v Collins, a Court of Appeal case which focused on the liability of an airplane inspector for 
certifying a plane that subsequently crashed,113  Lord Hoffmann noted that in the latter ‘the 
inspector had complete control over whether the aircraft flew or not. If he refused a certificate it 
could not fly.’114 BGS, on the other hand, had no control whatever, whether in law or in practice, 
over the supply of drinking water in Bangladesh, nor was there any statute, contract or other 
arrangement which imposed upon it responsibility for ensuring that it was safe to drink.115  
 
34. Lord Hoffmann also considered whether the case was one of misrepresentation, rather than 
misstatement, but found that the clear statements about what was tested and what was not meant 
that there was no misrepresentation on the potability of the water.116 Lord Hoffmann’s position 
suggests that the purpose and power of the auditor should matter. If the purpose of the study had 
been more than simply a pilot study, the result of leftover funding that could be used to start new 
lines of inquiry, or had it been linked to the drinking water project, the inquiry could have been 
different. 
 
35. The issue of power and oversight appears in other decisions addressing proximity. In Watson 
v British Boxing Board of Control, an injured boxer sued the professional boxing authority for 
negligent medical treatment when he was injured in a match.117 While lacking control over the 
danger – in this case, the physical harm suffered during a boxing match and the need for medical 
attention – Kennedy, LJ, noted that the danger was foreseeable.118 Were it not for the Board’s 
role in regulating medical care, the event promoter would instead owe the duty.119 But the Board 
set the rules governing medical care at boxing events.120 In exercising this level of power and 
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control, the board was in ‘close proximity with each individual boxer who contracts with a 
promoter to fight under the board’s rules.’121 
 
36. Finally, in Chandler v Cape, the Court of Appeal determined that parent companies can owe 
a duty of care to the employees of their subsidiaries where (1) the business of the two companies 
is, in a relevant aspect, the same, (2) the parent had or should have had superior knowledge of 
the health and safety standards for the industry, and (3) knew or ought to have known that the 
conditions at the subsidiary were unsafe, and (4) the parent knew or ought to have known that 
subsidiary and/or the employees would rely on the parent using its knowledge to protect the 
subsidiary’s employees.122 The parent company’s superiority knowledge, a form of power, and 
the reliance by the subsidiary’s employees on the company to use that power to influence 
conditions for their protection gave rise to a direct relationship between the parent and the 
subsidiary’s employees. The English courts are still working through some of the more difficult 
aspects of applying Chandler. Vedanta v Lungowe, pending before the UK Supreme Court at the 
time of editing, may soon impact this analysis.123 
 
3.2.4. Personal Injury and the Presence of Insurance 
37. The limitations on financial auditor responsibility are based on the assumption that 
misstatements from the industry will only result in economic loss, rather than personal injury or 
property damage. Where negligent misstatements by professionals trusted with care have 
foreseeably caused physical harm and losses, the courts have found that it is just and reasonable 
to find a more robust duty of care. In Perrett, discussed above, the Court of Appeal found that 
the airplane inspector owed a duty of care to a passenger harmed when the plane crashed.124 
Hobhouse, LJ, rejected an attempt to draw on cases of economic loss to limit the duty of care for 
the inspector.125 Instead, he declared that the reasons for limiting liability in cases of economic 
loss are ‘not germane to [cases of] personal injury.’126 This position underscores the importance 
of distinguishing duties of care based on the nature of the foreseeable harm, a position the House 
of Lords and others have addressed elsewhere.127 
 
3.3. Conclusions on the Duty of Care for Misstatements 
38. Financial auditors generally owe a duty of care only to individuals they know are likely to 
rely on the audit. Applying this to social auditors would limit social auditor liability to those 
workers who the auditor knows will rely on the audit and who, in fact, do so. As noted above, 
policy considerations can explain this limited duty of care for financial auditors. The limitation 
for purely economic loss represents an attempt to balance the need for accountability and 
reparations for negligence with the public interest in a viable and sustainable auditing industry. 
Applying this standard to social audits may be problematic for two reasons: first, vulnerable 
workers are unlikely to know the contents of a report even though they are reliant on it for their 
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protection, and the extension would apply a limitation designed for economic loss to situations of 
personal injury.  
 
39. By drawing on additional cases, it appears that duties of care may be owed to those who, by 
the nature of an industry or the purpose of professional advice, implicitly rely on the advice. 
Additionally, courts are likely to consider issues of power, control and vulnerability, and are 
likely to find a broader duty of care in cases where the plaintiffs suffered physical harm instead 
of simply economic loss. The next part considers what these additional factors might mean for 
social auditing. 
 
 4. Identifying an Appropriate Duty for Social Audits  
40. The financial industry’s duty of care in the underlying work and preparation of the report 
provide a foundation for the existence of a duty of care for workers who rely on the content of 
the report. This section questions whether the differences between financial and social auditing 
call for an extension of the duty of care to include even those who do not explicitly rely on the 
audit. It then turns to consider whether the duty should be deemed a non-delegable duty so that 
auditors like RINA remain liable for the actions of their sub-contractors, like the one whose 
conducted the audit at Ali Enterprises.  
 
4.1. Analysing the Duty Owed 
41. To conclude that social auditors owe a broader duty of care than that owed by financial 
auditors – that this represents an incremental step from the existing duty – English courts would 
need to conclude that the social auditor and the workers are in a proximate relationship, that the 
harm to workers by negligent social audits is foreseeable, and that it is just, reasonable and fair to 
impose this duty. All three of these factors are influenced by the vulnerability of the workers to 
abuse and negligence, which is at the heart of the social auditing industry. As explained above, 
social audits are primarily used in industries with documented histories of worker abuse. They 
have arisen as a means of responding to societal calls to protect vulnerable workers, particularly 
in states with weak governance mechanisms. Those harmed by a negligent social audit are likely 
to be individuals who are reliant on the social auditor as their primary means of protection. This 
vulnerability and the purpose of the audit in protecting workers and others present on an audited 
premises highlight three particular differences from financial auditors that suggest that the 
Caparo test is met and that the extension of responsibility is an appropriate incremental 
extension of the existing duty. These differences are: (1) the nature and purpose of the auditing 
industry generally and each audit in particular; (2) the vulnerability of those reliant on the 
advice, and (3) the risk of harm and the type of damage sustained as a result of negligent 
conduct. 
  
42. First, the purpose of the social auditing industry, and individual audits, is to identify 
immediate dangers to the human health and safety of individuals in a position of vulnerability. 
The immediacy of the relationship – only the direct purchaser interrupts the relationship, much 
like Smith – suggests a closer proximity between the workers and the social auditor than what 
was present in Sutradhar. In Sutradhar, the purpose was to provide a pilot assessment of some of 
the contaminants that can be dangerous to human health. It was not, however, intended to assess 
the potability of water or the full risk the water posed to human health. While the report would 
be shown to authorities, it was not supposed to influence the development of the water 
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distribution efforts. This sits in contrast to workers who are reliant on a social audit to protect 
them even when they are unaware of the contents of the report. This is similar to the 
relationships in Smith, where the purpose of the report was to protect the third party. The 
standards in the surveying industry also suggested that implicit reliance was commonplace, 
justifying a duty of care even when the purchasers are unaware of the report.  
The nature of the social auditing industry, and the purpose of individual audits, are both 
supposed to be directed at the protection of the worker. This suggests that an implicit reliance on 
the report – an expectation that the report will identify hazards to the worker so that they can be 
remediated, and that the auditor will follow up on remediation efforts – is reasonable. As the 
worker is also unable to secure external support or protection, or an independent assessment, it is 
just, reasonable, and fair to expect the social auditor to undertake their activities with the 
workers’ safety in mind. This does not guarantee that the auditor’s recommendations will be 
fully implemented, but that is an issue of causation to be examined in each case, rather than a 
factor relevant to the duty of care. 
 
43. The position of the workers and the nature of the harm raise the second issue, which are 
considerations of power, control, and vulnerability. A social audit is intended to provide layers of 
protection for the workers’ benefit and should identify deficiencies so that those with the power 
to fix a problem are aware that it needs to be fixed, and purchasers can exert pressure on the 
audited company to ensure this happens. A social audit that confirms compliance or acceptable 
standards communicates to those with power and influence that they need not exercise further 
oversight, while those that indicate deficiencies encourage greater oversight and mitigation 
efforts for the direct protection of the worker. This might appear on the surface to resemble the 
facts in Sutradhar, but there are significant differences in both power and control between social 
auditors and the researchers in Sutradhar. The Sutradhar researchers could only indirectly 
influence policy through their report. Social auditors exercise direct influence. Their audits are 
intended to lead to immediate changes not just in policy but in action, with clear remediation 
plans that are assessed in subsequent visits. As such, social auditors exercise significantly greater 
control and impact than what was exercised by the Sutradhar researchers through their report.  
 
44. Third, while a negligent financial audit is likely to cause only economic injury, a negligent 
social audit is more likely to lead to personal injury and property damage. As noted above, 
English law has long distinguished duties of care based on the type of damage caused. Where an 
activity is likely to cause personal injuries or property damage, as opposed to purely economic 
loss, English case law, notably Perrett, suggests that the actor has a broader duty of care to those 
around them and likely to be harmed by the action. The policy considerations that justify a 
‘control mechanism’ for financial audits are neither applicable nor appropriate to a social 
auditor. As such, a broader duty of care is appropriate. 
 
45. If the duty of care owed by financial auditors provides an appropriate foundational analogy, 
the nature of the social audit suggests an incremental step away from this duty is appropriate to 
address issues of purpose, power, vulnerability, control, and the harm suffered. Extending social 
auditor responsibility to those who implicitly rely on the audit’s accuracy would not create an 
open-ended duty. Instead, the duty of care would be owed to those routinely on the premises of 
an audited premises or who could reasonably be anticipated to be present in an audited facility. 
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While numerous, this would not become indefinite, a distinction the Court of Appeal invoked in 
Watson,128 suggesting a broader duty of care is reasonable, just and fair. 
 
4.2. Non-delegable Duties and Vulnerable Persons 
46. Extending the duty of care raises a final question pertinent for the Ali Enterprises and Bureau 
Veritas cases as to whether the duty is delegable. If a social auditor sub-contracts the work, can 
they assign the duty of care to the subcontractor? As Lord Sumption has explained, English law 
has a ‘long-standing policy … to protect those who are inherently vulnerable and highly 
dependent on the observance of proper standards of care by those with a significant degree of 
control over their lives.’129 As such, certain duties of care are non-delegable where (1) there is a 
vulnerable claimant or one who is ‘dependent on the protection of the defendant against the risk 
of injury,’ (2) with an established relationship that is independent of the negligence and gives the 
defendant a form of custody or control that ‘impute[s] to the defendant the assumption of a 
positive duty to protect the claimant from harm,’ rather than simply a negative duty to refrain 
from causing the harm directly, (3) the claimant does not and cannot control how the defendant 
performs his obligations, (4) the defendant has delegated to a third party the responsibility for a 
function necessary to discharge the duty, and (5) the third party was negligent in the discharge of 
that duty.130 For Lord Sumption, ‘[t]he essential element’ in such cases is not control over a 
particular premises, ‘but control over the claimant for the purpose of performing a function for 
which the defendant has assumed responsibility.’131  
 
47. These same elements arise in the context of social auditors. The purpose of the social auditor 
is to monitor, identify, and recommend for correction deficiencies that endanger those in a 
position of vulnerability, in industries with histories of abuse, who are reliant on the auditor to 
carry out that assumed responsibility. The relationship between the social auditor and those 
harmed by a negligent audit exists before, and is independent of, any negligence in the carrying 
out of the audit, and the workers are unable to control or dictate the conditions of the audit or the 
auditor’s performance. As such, social auditors assume a relationship that gives them an element 
of control over, and responsibility to protect, individuals in a vulnerable position who are 
dependent upon the auditor to fulfil their role. While one might reasonably argue that social 
auditors do not ‘control’ or exercise custody over the audited premises, control and custody can 
be temporary in nature, or limited to a particular place or relationship and are responsive to the 
particularities of the facts. As such, the UK Supreme Court found schools have a non-delegable 
duty of care to their students for school-related activities132 and employers have a non-delegable 
duty of care to their employees for safe work conditions.133 A duty of care could be based on a 
social auditor’s possession of a temporally limited control over the evaluation and identification 
of labour, environmental, and human rights conditions within a defined area. This duty would 
seemingly extend further than simply employees or others routinely on the premises. It would 
instead extend to anyone vulnerable to the deficiencies at audited premises. 
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5. Conclusion 
48. While the appropriateness of social auditing has been addressed in scholarship, this piece 
began a new line of scholarship examining the legal relationship between the social auditor and 
those who are supposed to be protected by their audits. The responsibility of social auditors is 
already before the courts in Canada and Italy, and the problems identified by numerous studies 
call for greater clarity on the industry’s obligations. Yet, scholarship has not tackled the legal 
responsibility of social auditors to those harmed by negligent audits. The social auditing industry 
is largely unregulated, and issues of negligent or deceptive behaviour have been identified.  
 
49. In considering the duty of care under English, this article considers not only how courts 
should decide disputes after a negligent audit but also how the social auditing industry itself 
should understand its private regulatory role. This article suggests that in addition to any 
contractual obligations, the social auditor owes a direct and independent duty of care to those 
who could foreseeably be harmed by the auditor’s negligence. The article analysed the duty of 
care owed by financial auditors to find that it would naturally extend to those who knowingly 
rely on a social audit before considering whether that duty should be extended to include those 
who implicitly rely on the social auditor. The auditor’s assumption of a positive duty to assess 
workplace conditions coupled with the worker’s vulnerability, the nature and purpose of the 
industry, and the likelihood of physical, not only economic, harm justifies extending the duty not 
only to those who explicitly rely on a social audit but also to those implicitly do so. This would 
reasonably extend the duty to workers on an audited property.  
 
50. The burgeoning nature of the social auditing industry makes this an area ripe for greater 
scholarly consideration. While this article focused on English tort law, it has broader 
implications. The business responsibility for human rights recognized in the UN Guiding 
Principles on business and human rights sits alongside long-standing, recognized obligations that 
states have to regulate businesses and industries for the protection of human rights and to provide 
adequate remedies for harms suffered by a business’s activities.134 Social auditors have filled a 
gap because states have failed to appropriately regulate own businesses and industries on their 
own territory. This alone is problematic as a matter of international law. Social auditors, 
however, represent not only a form of private regulation, but also their own industry and 
businesses. If social auditors are to function as private regulators, states must insist on greater 
clarity as to their purpose and to whom they owe their effective duty of care. 
  
51. By discussing problems with the industry and identifying questions and uncertainty over the 
ability of workers to hold auditors accountable, this article serves as a call for greater legal 
consideration of this industry. Relying on social auditors to advance state compliance with the 
UN Guiding Principles on business and human rights without sufficient regulation of the 
industry or adequate access to remedies represents a systemic failure of the state to meet its 
human rights obligations. While English law provides a means for extending liability to social 
auditors, states, social auditors, and lead brands need to re-evaluate their assumptions about the 
industry and ensure proper regulation and oversight. For states, this is a human rights obligation. 
For social auditors and lead brands, it is sound business practice as the alternative is to leave 
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themselves open not only to criticism but to expensive litigation over the failure to appropriately 
secure or conduct an audit. 
 
